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Individuals who identify as transgender or who perform their gender identity 
in non/anti-normative ways often find themselves in conflictual situations and 
can be subject to hostility, exclusion, and aggression by others who relate 
to and are part of the dominant gender culture. Instances of facework that 
occur in interpersonal interactions lend insights into how gender norms 
are enforced in particular communication moments. These moments are not 
seen or heard on a larger rhetorical or societal level, but are necessarily 
an integral part of gender culture. Such instances of reciprocal facework 
in moments of cultural and interpersonal conflict are important in better 
understanding the interpersonal implications of gender policing. In this 
critical review I look at how queer gender performativity may challenge 
notions of face and facework and provide possible new directions for further 
research.
There has been a great deal of research over the last few decades on 
how transgender and other-gendered individuals trouble or problematize 
the normative culture of gender (Bornstein, 1995; Bornstein & Bergman, 
2010; Butler, 1990; Nestle, Howell, & Wilchins, 2002; Stryker, 2008). These 
researchers, and others, have documented the dominant cultural ideology of 
gender as a binary, in which there is always one of two choices in terms of an 
individual’s gender—choices comprised of feminine and masculine, woman 
or man, or some other similar binary combination that denotes an expected 
action, display, or performance associated with a biologically sexed body 
(Drescher, 2010; Goffman, 1977; Valocchi, 2005; West, 1987). This culture 
of gender in which gendered bodies exist as a binary is also often linked with 
heterosexuality as being the dominant driving ideology and strategy for the 
continuation of gender norms (Butler, 1993a; Kaufmann, 2010). In addition, 
language, as a tool of dominant culture, medical rhetoric, and the biological 
sciences, is also cited as perpetuating the binary ideal of gender (Bloch & 
Lemish, 2005; Turner, 1999). Because these binary choices in gender are 
explicitly tied to the sex of an individual, those individual expressions or 
performances of gender that are non-normative or deviant from cultural 
gender expectations for a particular sex can be particularly problematizing 
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for the dominant culture of gender. When an individual’s performance of 
gender is incongruent with cultural expectations considering their sexed body, 
there is a direct challenge to gender norms through their performance. Gender 
norms, how we communicate our gender identity, and how we communicate 
from a situated moment of gender identification touch upon issues of agency, 
representation, epistemology, power, and performance (Butler, 1990/2008; 
Foucault, 1978/1990). Queer theory and studies or narratives involving 
transsexual, intersexed, genderqueer, and other transgender individuals 
also touch on these issues, often providing critiques of sex/gender binaries 
and examples of gender identities that can challenge dominant cultures and 
ideologies of gender (Boellstorf, 2004; Ehrensaft, 2009; Factor & Rothblum, 
2008; Stryker, 2006; Turner, 1999). While the focus of this paper is specific 
to transgender challenges to dominant gender culture, individuals who do 
not identify as transgender also have and continue to challenge the literal 
binaries of gender culture.
Prosser (1998, 2006) discusses the importance of transsexual studies in 
contemporary gender research to move understandings of gender past the 
literal and the binary. “Heterosexuality operates by attempting to literalize 
sex in the body; queer transgender reveals this depth as surface” (Prosser, 
2006, p. 271). Such research focuses on the lived ambiguities of transgender 
experiences in terms of relationships between assigned sex, biological sex, 
and then individual and cultural understandings of gender. Through examining 
ambiguities between these relationships, theorists and researchers have shown 
a literal separation—a deliteralization—between the cultural enforcement of 
categories of sex and gender and their more fluid lived experiences. While 
focusing on deliteralizing gender can provide theoretical, linguistic, and 
cognitive models for which to think of gender as other or non-binary (Butler, 
1993b; Butler, 1990/2008; Sedgwick, 1985), this research can neglect the 
real ways in which the enforcement of the dominant gender culture’s literal 
norms operate and continue to perpetuate gender binaries (Sloop, 2004). 
While Sloop’s “Disciplining Gender” looks to rhetoric and discourse to 
unveil the workings of gender enforcement, interpersonal communication 
can also provide rich and foundational examples of how gender norms are 
indeed policed and perpetuated. Specifically, issues of face and facework 
that occur in interpersonal interactions could lend insights into how gender 
norms are enforced in particular communication moments. 
While there has been a myriad of research on facework since Goffman’s 
(1955) initial conceptions (Manusov, Kellas, & Trees, 2004; Penman, 
1990; Spiers, 1998; Wood & Kroger, 1994), there has been little work done 
in the area of facework and gender performativity. Facework deals with 
the negotiations and strategies that individuals use when presenting and 
maintaining their identities in conversation (Manusov, et al., 2004). These 
moments are not often seen or heard on a larger rhetorical or societal level, 
but are necessarily an integral part of gender culture. 
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There is a particular need to take a critical look at existing research 
regarding face and facework in terms of non-normative gender performativity 
or “anti-normative” performativity (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 
2002, p. 165). Popularized by the work of Butler (1990, 1993a), gender 
performativity was derived from linguistics and speech act theory (Stryker, 
2006). Performativity involves more than just a performance of gender, and 
instead encompasses cultural, historical, linguistic, and relational factors 
that are tied to a moment of performance. Such research involves looking 
at facework and gender performativity from multiple cultural perspectives 
as well as in terms of face conflict. Those individuals who identify as 
transgender or who perform their gender identity in non/anti-normative ways 
often find themselves in conflictual situations and can be subject to hostility, 
exclusion, and, in some cases, aggression by others who relate to and are 
part of the dominant gender culture (Aoki, 2010; Beemyn, 2005; Scourfield, 
Roen, & McDermott, 2008). Instances of reciprocal facework in moments 
of cultural and interpersonal conflict are important in better understanding 
facework research as well as the interpersonal implications of gender policing. 
In this critical review, I look at how transgender performativity may challenge 
notions of facework and provide possible new directions for further research. 
Beginning with a brief discussion of gender identity and performativity, I 
then review conversations in existing literature about facework, gender, and 
transgender performativity as well as how research concerning facework 
models that involve culture, power, embarrassment, and fear can begin to 
incorporate transgender performativity. 
Gender Identity, Performativity, and Reflexivity
Butler suggests that gender identity is necessarily prior to any other 
identity and that “persons only become intelligible through becoming 
gendered in conformity with recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” 
(1990/2008, p. 22). She suggests that identity is a social phenomenon, and 
one in which gender plays a primary shaping role as a dictate of cultural 
understanding of a person as such. To be understood as a person means that 
there is a social recognition of a gendered person and that the gender must 
also be socially recognizable. However, Butler’s argument is not that we are 
non-persons prior to gender identity but that a discourse about identity or 
about a person cannot occur prior to or separate from a gendered identity. At 
the same time, Ehrensaft (2009) has shown that from birth to infancy, and 
up until at least their first year, a person does not have the capacity to either 
understand gender or to even begin to have a gender identity. Yet, infants are 
intelligible and are gendered. The agency of the newborn and the infant is with 
the parents or caretakers who, after the assignment of sex (however arbitrarily 
a sex is or can be assigned), can choose to begin to attribute gender. Gender 
is often assigned as a correlate to an infant’s assigned sex, with all males 
assigned as boys and all females assigned as girls. As an infant beginning a 
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gendered existence in a culture, the power and agency to begin the gendering 
process is with another. We do not begin our lives as gendered beings with 
any agency or power—only with (an arguably questionable) biology. 
Choices that are made as part of agency (whether that agency is of self or 
other) are not made in a vacuum but are made in a culture in which everything 
associated with gender is a duality or a binary—there is always only one 
of two choices. If, as Butler (1990/2008, p. 22) postulates, gender identity 
must precede any other identity, then how does a transgender person identify 
having a particular biologically sexed body that performs or acts culturally 
or socially as another gender? If, as Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, and Cain 
(1998) suggest, identity is both one’s own and others’ understanding and 
view of the self, how could a transgender individual possibly be understood 
with this mismatch of binaries? In this way, the issue of binaries becomes 
troubled and complicated by transgender persons. In some cases, transgender 
can even involve a fluidity of gender identity that seems to completely side 
step the binary categories of gender. Bornstein and Bergman (2010) provide 
an array of individual transgender narratives of people with fluid gender 
identities, including those who consider themselves genderqueer (Andre & 
Guitierrez, 2010; Luengsuraswat, 2010), mixed-gendered (Kusalik, 2010), 
and individuals who, while assigned a female sex at birth and a feminine 
gender, identify as men but prefer to express their gender in an ultra-feminine 
drag (Dalton, 2010; Rodriguez, 2010). At the same time, in a culture that 
designates binaries for gendered identities on three different fronts, it can 
still be difficult for a transgender individual to identify or be understood 
in a way other than at least one of the culturally prescribed binaries. In 
gendering, these three binaries include: the biological binary of male/female, 
the social and cultural binary of man/woman, and the linguistic binary that 
allows for the above namings, communications, or identifiers. These binaries 
are problematic for many reasons, not the least of which is that they do not 
allow for the recognition and acceptance of transgender performativity. A 
gendered identity simply cannot be understood without considering and 
being constricted by the biological, cultural, and linguistic binary choices 
that are available. 
However, discourse occurs in a multitude of ways in communicative 
action and not only through the binary possibilities that we encounter in 
language. Butler addresses this in discussions of phenomenology and identity 
by giving primacy to performativity as discourse in identity (Butler, 1993b). 
As West and Zimmerman (1987) show, gender performance is far more than 
Goffman’s (1977) idea of gender display; there is also a communicative 
reflexivity to performance. The communication of a gender or a gender 
identity involves not just a performance, but also a reception, understanding, 
or interpretation of the performance. At the same time, “doing gender”—
performing gender—does not imply the possibility of an opposite: an undoing 
of gender. Gender is always there as a cultural social construct in which each 
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of us is situated (Cole, 2009). As a result, doing gender as the performance 
it has to be is a continual, situated event marked by reflexivity with itself, 
other performances, and reactions to performances. “Doing gender” is 
multi-dimensional and is not necessarily constricted by binaries. In Gender 
Trouble, Butler argues that gender identity occurs through performativity 
as a “unity of experience” in which gender identity is constituted by the 
expression of gender (1990/2008, p. 30, 34). In this way, performativity is 
the discourse in which gender has to occur and is always occurring. However, 
while getting beyond the binary of language through performativity, Butler 
believes that the history of binaries in gender identity, the culture of gender, 
and the understandings of biology are all a part of performativity. The binary 
is a part of gender performance regardless of agency or intent to perform. 
Culture includes a complex relationship with history and biology that cannot 
be separated from any individual gender performance. 
Although performativity as discourse is not binary in its multi-
dimensionality (in terms of history, culture, and agency) or in its 
phenomenological status in particular performative moments, the way we 
talk about and categorize that performativity—and the way it is understood 
culturally—still exists in the binary choices of language. Regardless of how 
I choose to perform my gender, I will always be categorized as either a male 
or female and, usually, correspondingly as a man or a woman. My choice 
and agency in gendering lay in my performance, but the social and cultural 
reception, categorization, or interpretation of my performance discourse 
(including binary language used to describe my gender) is not something I 
have complete agency over. I only have agency in regards to a portion of my 
performativity—in my doing or performance of gender. In addition, gender 
performativity as an expression of a continuously constructed identity is 
always dynamic and changing as identity continues to be influenced by its 
own performance and others’ receptions or interpretations. As a result, the 
reflexivity inherent in gender performativity calls for a critical view of not 
only the performance of gender but also the reception of the performance. In 
terms of interpersonal communication and facework, gender performativity 
involves communicative action on the part of the performer and recipient. 
Gender Performativity and Facework 
Despite certain works on politeness theory and facework that explain 
communicative action in face and facework as linguistically based in 
the speech act (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Lakoff, 1975; Spiers, 1998), 
performance and performativity also play a role in communication, 
interpersonal dynamics, and issues of face. There have been multiple 
definitions of facework, starting with Goffman who explains facework as 
actions taken by a person to be consistent with their face and to counteract 
instances of threats to one’s face (Goffman, 1963, p. 12). This feature of action 
in facework builds on Goffman’s theories of performance as communication 
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in everyday contexts (Goffman, 1959). Goffman’s initial focus on actions 
(as opposed to only verbal communication) in terms of facework and 
performance in communication have been revisited by researchers since then 
who have likewise brought the possibility of inclusion of performativity into 
the facework fold (Manusov, et al., 2004; Tracy, 1990). 
Facework researchers also break down face and facework in ways that 
are pertinent to transgender performativity. Goffman (1955) introduced the 
differences between corrective and preventative facework. While corrective 
facework involves the saving of face after an instance of face threat, 
preventative or “avoidant” facework involves positioning and strategies 
to protect one’s face from potential threat (Goffman, 1955, p. 220-222). In 
gender performativity these aspects of facework are tied to an individual’s 
identity as well as to an individual’s understanding of their identity in a 
given cultural context. Differentiation between types of face claims is also 
pertinent in facework and performativity. Two types of face claims were 
developed through research in politeness theory that distinguish between 
positive face and negative face (Tracy, 1990). Tracy describes positive 
face as “the desire to be appreciated and approved of by select others” and 
negative face as “a person’s want to be unimpeded and free from imposition 
(p. 210). These face claims are dynamic in communicative actions of gender 
performativity in that positive and negative face can be operating at the same 
time in an individual who expresses a transgender identity. A desire to be 
unimpeded in their expression of gender (negative face) can be combined 
with a desire to be approved of by either the dominant gender culture or any 
other non-dominant gender culture to which they belong. At the same time, 
people who are viewing the performance of transgender identity expression 
have their own negative and positive face wants. These wants can be related 
to their acceptance by the dominant gender culture and an expectation to 
be unimpeded in their normative gender expression or normative gender 
understandings. Further complicating dynamics of facework in gender 
performativity, researchers also differentiate between self-face and other-face, 
with the former being a focus on self-image, and the latter being a focus on 
another’s image (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Likewise, in performativity 
there can always be a focus or an acknowledgement of a gender performance 
being viewed and interpreted by another. In this acknowledgement, while 
performativity is about self-face in terms of gender identity expression, 
there can also be recognition of other-face in the performance. These 
three components of face and facework show the complexity of facework 
interactions in gender performativity on a basic level.
Finally, according to Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, Yokochi, Masumoto, and 
Takai (2000) there has been a great deal of research on facework in terms 
of requests and conflict styles but not in terms of identity and identity 
conflict. Research on facework in favor-asking and requests for assistance 
has focused on resolving conflict and conflict styles instead of relational 
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and identity issues (Oetzel, et al., 2000). Relational and identity aspects of 
facework are paramount in understanding interactions involving transgender 
performances (Khayatt, 2002). In addition, gender cultural differences play a 
part in identity and relational issues in these interactions. In the three sections 
below, I introduce select facework research that addresses these issues in 
some ways, but which could be improved as inclusive models through the 
incorporation of an understanding of transgender identity, gender cultures, 
and performativity.
Culture in Gender Performativity and Facework
Ting-Toomey’s (2004) conception of face negotiation theory integrates 
cultural considerations and conflict with interpersonal communication in 
a way that can be useful in considering facework in gender identity and 
performativity. In face negotiation theory, the concept of face deals with 
identity and respect for identity in the context of an encounter as well as in the 
greater cultural context (Ting-Toomey, 2004). Using religion and interfaith 
couples as an example, Ting-Toomey explains that identity conflict goals in 
particular are linked both to an individual’s underlying beliefs and goals as 
well as to cultural beliefs and goals. As in other intercultural interactions, in 
gender performativity the performer and viewer/receiver have cultural and 
individual beliefs that should be taken into consideration. 
However, troubling or complicating face negotiation theory is that 
there could be more than two sets of cultures and beliefs when considering 
communicative situations involving a transgender person or individual 
performing a non-normative gender identity and an individual who expresses 
normative gender identity. A transgender person may belong to a culture or 
community(ies) related to their particular gender identity(ies) as well as to a 
minority culture within the dominant heteronormative gender culture. These 
two cultures then would be at play with the dominant heteronormative culture 
of normative gender identity. For instance, an individual such as Sherilyn 
Connelly (2010), who is male sexed but identifies as a woman and performs 
the gender identity of a woman, may participate in a transgender culture but 
always also belongs to the dominant culture of heteronormativity, although 
most likely in the margins of that culture. Connelly, who decided not to have 
sex reassignment surgery, explains the complexities of being transgender 
and not transsexual, “I’m not a boy because I have a penis, and just because 
I don’t have a vagina doesn’t mean I’m not a girl” (p. 81). Connelly finds 
herself always wondering whether she is “guilt[y]-by-biological-association” 
because she has a penis. She is perceived as a “threat” in cultural activities 
such as music festivals and bathhouses because of anatomy and despite 
gender performance (Connelly, p. 80). Connelly has an understanding of 
her status in dominant gender culture, but also finds that it can conflict with 
her status in transgender or feminine subcultures. Another example is that 
of Nico Dacumos, who also falls under the umbrella identity category of 
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transgender, has a biologically sexed body of a female, identifies as gender-
fluid, and performs as neither a man nor a woman. “Nico is a flaming queer 
radical polysexual two-spirited female-bodied … transgender butch fag…” 
(Dacumos, 2006, p. 22). Dacumos explains, “I find that I fail miserably at 
being a guy, whether it’s with butches or transmen or any other masculine-
identified people. I feel more comfortable with femmes of any gender, but I 
don’t quite present or feel feminine enough to call myself femme” (p.  33). 
Dacumos’s gender performativity could be purposely ambiguous and 
unidentifiable to a communication partner in regards to the dominant gender 
binary. These examples bring up questions of how transgender individuals 
engage in facework in an instance of cultural conflict or confrontation with 
an individual who performs their gender normatively and identifies with the 
dominant gender culture. 
Face negotiation theory is based on a dualism of collectivist versus 
individualist ideologies that researchers found operating in different 
cultures in cross-cultural comparisons of individuals from different nations 
or geographical locations (Oetzel, et al., 2000). In the above situations of 
potential conflicts in different gender cultures however, both individuals 
belong to the same dominant culture—neither as necessarily conforming 
participants, but both as part of the culture. Issues of individualist versus 
collectivist do not apply in the same way, as the two (or more) different 
gender cultures are part of a larger cultural system of shared gendered social 
patterns. However, the individuals also do belong to different cultures with 
different values in terms of gender identity and conformity. Connelly (2010) 
describes transsexuals she has met who have different feelings about having 
a penis than she does, and this can affect her interpersonal relations in that 
culture. Also, despite identifying and performing as a woman, Connelly 
describes difficulties being able to fully participate in women’s communities 
due to her assigned sex as a male. The intercultural issue at play in facework 
between the members of different gender cultures is not (necessarily) an 
issue of individualism or collectivism, but instead is (necessarily) focused 
on the connection between biological sex and gender performativity. While 
this does not negate face negotiation theory, it does trouble the idea of 
cultural variability in the theory, which is based on the variability between 
individualists and collectivists.
In different gender cultures, there can be differences in core cultural 
beliefs between the dominant culture and non-normative gender cultures, 
as well as differences in core beliefs and values among the various non-
normative or transgender cultures. Butler (1990) outlines some of the 
former in her review of essentialist versus constructionist ideas of gender, 
also highlighting the differences between different feminist understandings 
of constructionism, masculinity, and sex. More recent studies of queer 
and transgender communities have also shown cultural differences 
and core value differences among cultures of people who share similar 
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 10, 2011:  81Wight
non-normative identities. Hansbury (2005) examines the vast cultural 
differences in transmasculine identities, differentiating between three distinct 
transmasculine cultures (categorized as Woodworkers, Transmen, and 
Genderqueers) in which individuals communicate from very different points 
of core gender beliefs and values. Similarly, Beemyn (2005), focusing on 
college students, discusses diversity in identities of individuals in different 
queer and transgender groups. The value differences that Beemyn finds are 
between the culture of demographically older transgender people who strive 
for and identify as transsexual and the culture of younger transgender people 
who separate sex from gender and identify as genderqueer. Each culture has 
distinct values regarding gender that could cause variations in their concepts 
of positive and negative face and, as a result, would also cause variations in 
facework strategies and understandings. These types of cultural variabilities 
are not included in face negotiation theory. 
Following from this troubling of cultural variability in face negotiation 
theory, typologies that have been made in facework research based on this 
particular conception of cultural variability may be incomplete when trying 
to understand facework interactions between individuals of different gender 
cultures. Oetzel and Ting-Toomey (2003) conducted research involving 
American and Japanese college students and developed a 16-category 
typology for facework. They chose American and Japanese participants to 
attempt to capture the facework strategies from both individualist (American) 
and collectivist (Japanese) individuals. The issue of differences in gender 
cultures was simply not part of the research into typologies. If, as mentioned 
above, identity conflict goals in particular are linked both to an individual’s 
underlying beliefs and goals as well as to cultural beliefs and goals (Ting-
Toomey, 2004), and those cultural beliefs and goals do not agree with 
the prescribed cultural dualism of collectivist vs. individualist that Ting-
Toomey identifies, then how can facework differences due to gender culture 
differences be understood through this 16-category typology? In fact, Ting-
Toomey states, “any facework typology used in a cross-cultural interpersonal 
communication study must include strategies which are applicable to the 
cultures of the study” (Ting-Toomey, 1994, p. 313). In order to fully address 
facework concerning gender performativity, cultural differences among 
individuals from different queer gender cultures need to be included in some 
way among the cultural variables of face negotiation theory.
Power, Rights, and the Other in Facework
Lim and Bowers (1991) took a different approach to facework that is 
also important to issues of facework in gender performativity and is based 
on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) work on politeness theory. In their study, 
Lim and Bowers found that politeness theory was too limiting in instances 
of conflictual facework and did not adequately account for acts that threaten 
people’s positive face—the aspect of face that accounts for conflict. They 
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conceptualized three types of facework—solidarity, approbation, and tact—
and studied them in terms of power, intimacy, and “rights” to perform or 
act. While their research has been criticized as being limited due to its focus 
on other-face and lack of attention to self-face (Ting-Toomey, 1994), the 
other-face aspect of gender performativity is important to understanding 
the policing and perpetuation of gender norms in dominant culture. In its 
reflexivity, performativity involves a turn toward the viewer or other. In the 
viewer’s response to a gender performance by a transgender person, there 
is an interpersonal exchange that then allows for either a space outside of 
dominant binaries for transgender expressions or, conversely, a closing of 
space and possibilities that excludes culturally non-normative expression. 
There is an opportunity either for policing or for understanding in the 
“other” of the performative action, so the other-face directiveness of the 
Lim and Bowers typology seems to have considerable potential and could 
be particularly useful for understanding facework in gender performativity. 
Lim and Bowers (1991) also showed that those communicative situations 
in which an individual had both power and rights were less likely to include 
facework especially in situations between those less intimate. When looking 
at gender performativity through this research lens, one would expect 
that those who display more normative gender identities would feel more 
powerful and believe themselves to have more of a right to their performance 
than those who engage in transgender performativity. However, because 
both performativity and facework are reflexive and dynamic, how do these 
individuals engage in facework together?
Issues of power and “right” have been seen as dominant forces in the 
continuation of binary gender categories (Butler, 1990/2008; Foucault, 
1978/1990; Foucault, 1982) and are likewise of interest in the interpersonal 
facework interactions in gender performativity. As mentioned above, 
performativity is reflexive by definition in that it is always moving from 
performer to viewer and then back again. It is also reflexive in its constant 
referral back to cultural and societal history despite being phenomenologically 
based in a moment of performance and expression (Butler, 1990). In addition, 
gender performativity as an expression of a continuously constructed identity 
is always dynamic and changing as identity continues to be influenced by its 
own performance. For Lim and Bowers (1991), the issue of power, rights, 
and agency influence facework in these reflexive communicative actions. In 
terms of transgender performativity in the face of dominant gender culture, 
the already existing power structures within gender culture are at play with 
the interpersonal positions of power that can determine facework strategies. 
Based on this theory, a transgender individual performing an ambiguous, 
fluid, or “other” gender is usually already at a power disadvantage in an 
interpersonal interaction with an individual expressing normative gender 
identity in a communicative moment. At the same time, the reflexivity of 
performativity allows for a constant exchange of power in the interaction by 
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moving from performer to viewer and then back to performer. The dynamics 
of these power exchanges in an interpersonal communicative situation of 
gender expression should be researched to better understand the dynamics 
of power in gender facework.
Embarrassment, Facework, and Gender Performativity
Embarrassment has been covered extensively in facework and relational 
research, and there have been a multitude of definitions of embarrassment 
(Costa, Dinsbach, Manstead, & Bitti, 2001; Cupach & Metts, 1994; Edelmann, 
1985; Higuchi & Fukada, 2002; Petronio, Clark, & Dollar, 1989; Sharkey, 
Kulp, Carpenter, Lee, & Rodillas, 1997). However, while embarrassment has 
played a large role in facework studies, a model of embarrassment provides 
difficulties when considering facework in transgender performativity. Keltner 
and Buswell state that, “Embarrassment occurs when individuals fail to 
behave in accordance with socially defined scripts and roles” (1997, p. 261). 
The problem with this statement and similar statements about embarrassment 
is that the cause of embarrassment is not necessarily a “failure” on the part 
of an individual, but is necessarily caused by a rigidity or lack of fluidity 
in social norms and expectations. In some cases, this cultural rigidity may 
be warranted if it provides for an individual’s safety, freedom, or health. 
Safety, freedom, and health are not at stake in the case of normative gender 
expectations though. In fact, the arbitrary rule of gender in our dominant 
culture does the opposite—often putting the transgender individual’s safety, 
freedom, and health at risk if they do not conform to gender expectations. 
Further, while embarrassment may occur on an interpersonal level, it is 
rooted in cultural expectations. In the case of gender, the dominant cultural 
expectations are ones in which no individual has agency. As explained above, 
an individual does not have agency in regard to the assignment of sex, gender 
roles, or in the reception of a gender performance. This lack of agency in 
gendering suggests that in transgender performativity, an individual does not 
cause embarrassment through any personal failure; the failure occurs on a 
level outside of the individual at the societal and cultural level. 
However, embarrassment does still play an important role in facework 
and in transgender performativity and face. Looking at the embarrassing 
social predicament as a model to study facework, Cupach and Metts (1994) 
write about the relationship between identities, uncomfortable feelings, and 
facework due to embarrassment. Drawing upon and furthering Goffman’s 
earlier writings about embarrassment in social interactions, the researchers 
explain that “the individual who performs behavior creating embarrassment 
may or may not correspond to the individual feeling embarrassment, or the 
person for whom embarrassment is felt” (Cupach & Metts, 1994, p. 18). As 
in the work of Lim and Bowers (1991) above, the focus of facework research 
on embarrassment is a focus on other-face in interpersonal interactions. The 
issue in embarrassment becomes centered on the complexities of a relational 
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dynamic in which the viewer or dialogue participant may feel embarrassment 
either for or about a breach of behavior that defies dominant gender norms. 
As a result, work in embarrassment and facework can be particularly 
important in further understanding the turn in interactions that allows for 
either the policing or the opening of space in gender expression. In addition, 
there is also a reflexivity in embarrassment models in which the one who 
causes embarrassment can be viewed as “tactless” and responsible for the 
situation by offending another through their actions of neglecting social 
rules and norms (Cupach and Metts, 1994, p. 23). With the combination of 
embarrassment occurring, whether it was purposeful or not, and then the 
possibility of blame for not following social norms, there is great potential 
for a transgender person to be involved in such a facework predicament. 
Because of essentialist beliefs about gender, sex, and identity, often times 
non-normative gender performance can be construed as a choice to violate 
rules and norms. As a result, those performances of gender identity that may 
embarrass another because they are nonconforming may be strongly attributed 
and linked to the responsibility of the transgender performer. Cupach and 
Metts explain that the stronger such linkage, the more severe the predicament 
is (1994). Facework responses to embarrassment can include aggression and 
criticism (Cupach & Metts, 1994), and in the case of gender performativity, 
assist in the “disciplining” of gender (Sloop, 2004). Also, because of the 
primacy of embarrassment and its link to fear in social situations (Miller, 
2001), there is a need for further study of embarrassment, facework, and 
non-normative gender performativity.
Cupach and Metts (1994) also review literature that results in the 
categorization of five main events or situations that cause embarrassment 
and that can be seen as potential sites for facework. Of particular interest in 
studying facework in instances of transgender performativity are the events 
labeled as “impropriety,” “conspicuousness,” and “breach of privacy” 
(Cupach & Metts, 1994, p. 19). The labeling and consideration of an act of 
gender non-conformity as embarrassing would most likely come from one 
of these three categories of events. Impropriety is defined as “a failure to 
observe standards or show due honesty or modesty” (New Oxford American 
Dictionary, 2010). This pairing—not observing standards with dishonesty—
points to an immediate negative association between breaches of culture 
such as gender non-conformity and negative personal characteristics. In fact, 
Cupach and Metts use “improper dress” and “dirty talk” as their examples 
of impropriety (1994, p. 19). Since a great deal of transgender performances 
include “improper dress” in that the choices of apparel are often incongruent 
with a person’s assigned biological sex (Bornstein, 1995; Crawley, 2002; 
Eves, 2004; Pitts, 2006; West & Zimmerman, 1987), it is likely that this 
negative category of impropriety would be considered an instance of such 
an embarrassment event. Further, because Cupach and Metts’s second 
category of “conspicuousness” involves sticking out or being other than 
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the norm, performances of gender nonconformity can often be included in 
this embarrassment event as well. The third category of “breach of privacy” 
is one that could occur in specific instances of gender non-conformity in 
private places such as sexed restrooms where individuals as a result of 
dominant gender culture expect gender performance to coincide with assigned 
biological sex. There may also be a privacy expectation to exclude other-
sexed and therefore (culturally) other-gendered persons from their private 
restroom space. There have been numerous recent studies on the experiences 
of transgender and other gender non-conforming individuals in public sexed 
restrooms—experiences that range from uncomfortable to aggressive and 
threatening (Brown, 2004; Pitts, 2006; Elkind, 2007; West, 2010). These 
instances of breaches of privacy in public spaces, and especially restrooms, 
are also important to the understanding of facework interactions in gender 
nonconformity and the perpetuation of gender norms in dominant culture.
Conclusion
While there may be many more obvious examples of gender 
performativity in our culture that appear in media and other forms of rhetoric, 
the exploration and study of less known and more intimate interpersonal 
communicative moments of transgender performativity can be instructive 
in terms of the perpetuation of gender norms and the dynamics involved in 
transgender oppression. While past facework research has not considered 
transgender performances or performativity, communication research in the 
field of face and facework reveals possibilities for new and expanded research 
in the particular area of gender facework. First, face negotiation theory points 
to cultural variability as key to understanding facework dynamics, but its 
propositions are based only on specific cultural values. The theory assumes 
these values to be pertinent in all facework dynamics. However, when 
considering facework in transgender performativity, differing understandings 
of gender are essential cultural variabilities that need to be accounted for. 
This idea of value variance in subcultures is not only important in studying 
transgender performativity, but can be instructive in understanding facework 
dynamics within any non-dominant culture.
Power and its exchange further trouble facework research. While power 
in interpersonal dynamics is important in some approaches to traditional face 
and facework theory and research, gender performativity consists of additional 
layers of various power relations that must be considered in transgender 
understandings of facework. Power in terms of gender expression, biological 
sex, and the relationships between the two can complicate understandings 
of facework dynamics, but also may provide richer understandings of how 
power can operate in interpersonal communicative moments.
Third, embarrassment can be an especially effective model when 
trying to understand facework in situations between queer and hegemonic 
expressions of gender. Many individuals face violence and aggression 
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when expressing gender in nonconforming performances. These reactions 
or fears of these reactions can enforce cultural hegemony and policing in 
gender expressions. While there can certainly be a variety of cultural and 
interpersonal rationales for such reactions to transgender performativity, 
embarrassment provides a perspective in facework from which violence, 
aggression, and impertinence can be begin to be understood in these facework 
dynamics. Some embarrassment concepts such as impropriety may seem 
outdated in light of transgender performances, but can still be instructive 
in understanding the heteronormative reception of transgender expressions.
Finally, there are relational and identity issues in facework that often 
are not considered in facework research, but are necessarily important 
when researching gender and specifically transgender performativity. While 
literature from the current body of facework research can be applied to 
facework in transgender performativity, the reflexive qualities of gender 
performativity, differences in gender cultures, and issues of power in gender 
and in dominant gender culture point to the necessity for specific research 
regarding gender performativity and facework. By looking at facework from 
a performativity perspective and including the various gender cultures in 
facework study, the communication discipline can move toward a greater 
understanding of interpersonal dynamics in transgender performances. Such 
research may show possibilities for non-binary understandings of gender as 
well as find existing spaces for gender inclusivity within interactions.
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